The project of justifying human rights, considered from various philosophical perspectives canvassed in the previous chapter, might be thought to be characteristic of what is variously called the ‘naturalistic’, ‘orthodox’ or ‘traditional’ conception of human rights. These approaches typically hold that what grounds human rights is to be found in some kind of account of the nature of human beings or some facet of humanity. But how the moral rights so justified translate into political and legal realities remains somewhat mysterious, even if the project of justification itself is successful. In contrast to this approach, the political conception of human rights holds that the naturalistic conception is mistaken in important and fundamental ways.
Swipe to navigate through the chapters of this book
Please log in to get access to this content
To get access to this content you need the following product:
- A Political Conception of Human Rights
- Macmillan Education UK
- Sequence number
- Chapter number