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About this book

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has come a long way since its inception as the European Security and Defence Identity under NATO. Yet more than a decade after emerging as an autonomous entity, with its own capacity for civilian crisis management and military action, the European Union's CSDP is still very much a work in progress.

This fully revised and updated new edition provides the most comprehensive account available of the CSDP and the debates surrounding it. Written by a leading authority in the field, the second edition draws on the author's own extensive research in the area, including hundreds of interviews with key actors, and takes account of developments since the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty. A brand new chapter assesses international relations theory and European integration theory as tools to understand the CSDP, and critically engages with theoretical approaches that view security and defence policy as the exclusive domain of sovereign nation-states. The book concludes with an analysis of future hurdles for the European Union as it responds to new and often unpredictable crises across the globe.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction: CSDP — A ‘Work in Progress’

Abstract
The notion of a ‘work in progress’ is particularly appropriate for Europe’s efforts to emerge as a security actor. The phrase was used by James Joyce as the working title of his novel, serialized over 20 years and eventually published in 1939 as Finnegan’s Wake. In it, he insisted on the interplay between the conscious and the unconscious in his unprecedented attempt to break with literary tradition and to create an entirely new literary paradigm, appropriate for the twentieth century. Unconsciously, or semi-consciously, Europeans are moving towards a new security paradigm. They have not yet achieved full consciousness of where they are trying to go or what they are seeking to achieve. They have been conscious since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War that the guarantee of their collective security hangs in an uncomfortable balance between dependence and autonomy, between the hand of fate and freedom of manoeuvre. Between 1949 and 1989, dependence and fate held Europe’s security hostage to the imponderables of the American nuclear umbrella in a standoff with the Soviet Union based on ‘mutual assured destruction’. ‘Defence’ was an existential zero-sum game. There was little space for autonomy or freedom of manoeuvre.
Jolyon Howorth

Chapter 2. Decision-Making: The Political and Institutional Framework

Abstract
‘You can’t send a wiring diagram to a crisis.’ — George Roberson, NATO Secretary General, 1999
Jolyon Howorth

Chapter 3. The Instruments of Intervention: Generating Military and Civilian Capacity

Abstract
While the creation of institutions through which to manage a foreign, security and, eventually, defence policy is necessary, the procurement and delivery of the instruments of that policy — military and civilian capacity — is indispensable. Had anybody predicted, as 1998 drew to a close, that within five years the European Union would be engaging in autonomous military and policing missions in ‘non-permissive’ theatres, under a European command chain and the European flag, s/he would have been regarded by most serious analysts as a wild-eyed dreamer. The late 1990s represented a low point in European hopes of establishing a military capacity which would allow the Union to engage in peacekeeping and crisis management missions independently of the US (Gnesotto 1998; Gordon 1997–8). Already, the limitations of ESDI had become apparent. In 1999, the brief campaign in Kosovo demonstrated unequivocally that, compared with the US military, European forces could hope to do little more than play a very subordinate backup role (Brawley and Martin 2000; Bozo 2003). Yet in December 2001, the European Council declared its objective of being able to field operational combat-ready troops by 2003 (Rutten 2002: 131). The reaction from strategic experts around the world was one of extreme scepticism (CDS 2001; IISS 2001).
Jolyon Howorth

Chapter 4. Selling it to Uncle Sam… CSDP and Transatlantic Relations

Abstract
‘If your ultimate aim is to provide for your own defence, then the time to tell us is today!’ — President George H. W. Bush to his European allies, NATO summit, Rome, October 1991
Jolyon Howorth

Chapter 5. The EU as an Overseas Crisis Management Actor

Abstract
‘What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight — it’s the size of the fight in the dog.’ — Dwight D. Eisenhower
Jolyon Howorth

Chapter 6. Empirical Reality and Academic Theory

Abstract
I have argued in this book that CSDP emerged overwhelmingly as a series of empirical reactions to major historical events. While visionaries in London, Paris, Brussels and other cities dreamed up blueprints for CSDP’s short- and medium-term trajectory, which political leaders worked hard to shape, it was the dual movement of history’s tectonic plates on the two symbolic dates of 9/11 (9 November 1989 — fall of the Berlin Wall — and 11 September 2001 — the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington) that acted as principal fertilizer and incubator of this new policy area. Among the many consequences of those twin earthquakes, one which stemmed equally strongly from both of them was the relative disengagement of the USA from its 50-year role as guarantor of European security. Not only did the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall remove Europe as the central blip on the US radar screen, but the 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks also obliged Washington to concentrate its available resources and forces in other parts of the world. While teleology should be firmly rejected as an explanatory factor (nothing is inevitable solely because of historical forces), this volume is predicated on the belief that ‘events’ were largely responsible for the specific course CSDP has taken.
Jolyon Howorth

Chapter 7. Conclusion: The Major Challenges Ahead

Abstract
‘Success consists in going from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm.’ — Winston Churchill
Jolyon Howorth
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