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About this book

A constantly evolving security agenda has become a vital part of US–EU relations. Contemporary security challenges such as the rise of international terrorism and the threat from 'states of concern' have – in recent years – forced the US and the EU to adapt their relationship and work together in new ways.

Written by a leading authority, this incisive and wide-ranging book systematically examines the development of the transatlantic security relationship in the post-Cold War era. It assesses the nature of the US and EU as international actors and considers how they cooperate together. Rees argues that – despite divergences of interest after the end of the Cold War – the complex nature of contemporary challenges is driving both sides of the Atlantic towards increased cooperation. In addition, the book looks in detail at how global and European issues such as EU defence and enlargement policies, nuclear non-proliferation, and the war on terror have affected security relations.>

Table of Contents

Introduction

Abstract
In the post-Cold War period, the United States (US) security relationship with the European Union (EU) is an important subject for analysis. Books on the transatlantic security relationship traditionally focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the formal alliance arrangement that has guaranteed the defence of Europe. NATO includes amongst its members the states of the EU, but the two organizations are not coterminous and NATO includes non-EU members such as Canada and Turkey. Conversely, books on the US-EU relationship have tended to concentrate on economics because the EU and its forerunner, the European Community (EC), was principally a trading actor. This book is therefore somewhat unusual in its approach, raising the question: can security really be regarded as vital to America’s relationship with the EU?
Wyn Rees

Chapter 1. Conceptualizing the Transatlantic Relationship

Abstract
It is readily apparent that the US and the EU are dissimilar types of actors. The US is a single state with a federal political structure. Its size and power accords it the ability to act decisively in the world and to gather other states behind its leadership. The EU comprises a group of states, all with different histories. They have been brought together by shared interests, but the process of European integration is still evolving and remains a ‘work in progress’. The EU is a unique experiment, a sui generis actor, in which there is no single vision about what it will eventually become. Prime Minister Tony Blair (2000) described the EU as an emerging superpower but not a superstate. Both the US and the EU are guided by the power of ideas. They possess a sense of legitimacy that they derive from their own political and economic systems. The power of these ideas differs in the case of the US and the EU and helps to explain their approaches to security.
Wyn Rees

Chapter 2. States and Institutional Relationships

Abstract
States normally provide for their own security. By doing so they can preserve their sovereignty and maximize their freedom of action. They do not have to place their trust in others to come to their assistance and they are not in fear of being let down in a crisis. But if states are unable to guarantee their own security, because the level of threat exceeds their strength, they may seek to join with others. This may remain an informal arrangement within a coalition or it may be formalized within an alliance (Riker, 1962). The results have the advantage of creating patterns of regularized behaviour and expectations of reciprocity amongst participating states (Haas, 1997). Liberal institutionalists argue that by choosing to invest responsibility for security activity in an institution, states become socialized into patterns of working together. They begin to develop norms and agreed ways of conducting their relationships. The bureaucracy that services the institution may evolve over time to assume a life of its own, and the institution itself may outgrow the role for which it was originally intended.
Wyn Rees

Chapter 3. From the European Security and Defence Identity to the Common Security and Defence Policy

Abstract
The demands of the post-Cold War security environment have imposed strains on US-European relations as well as exposed differences in strategic culture and operational doctrine. On the one hand, this has stemmed from the differences in size and capability: the US has devoted around 3.8 per cent of its gross domestic product to defence compared to a European average of around 1.9 per cent (Economist, 2006b, 23). This has made it difficult for other countries to work alongside the US. It has made the US reluctant to rely upon the less capable military power of its allies in coalition operations. On the other hand, it has stemmed from the strategic culture that has flowed from American ascendancy. The ‘Powell doctrine’ (formulated by Colin Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) stipulated that America must conduct expeditionary operations only with overwhelming force: that it must have a clear objective and enjoy widespread public support: that it must be in a position to impose a solution and then it must extricate itself before it becomes bogged down. This culture has proved problematic in the face of complex, hybrid emergencies into which the US has been drawn. Such conflicts have not been susceptible to resolution by the short-term application of military power.
Wyn Rees

Chapter 4. The Enlargement of the European Union

Abstract
Organizational enlargement should be seen as an issue at the heart of the security debate in US-EU security relations since the end of the Cold War. It has represented an attempt to overcome the military security divide in Europe and return the continent to normal, rather than ‘securitized’, politics. It has therefore raised a question mark about the ‘overlay’ of superpower interests and the future role of the US in European security. Mindful that decisions taken by the EU would impact on its interests, American policymakers were concerned at the risk of being excluded from decisions about an enlarging Europe. The influence that the US could wield derived also from the decisive role that it could play in the enlargement of NATO.
Wyn Rees

Chapter 5. States of Concern

Abstract
The US saw itself during the Cold War as global actor with a commensurate range of interests. In contrast, it regarded Europe as a regional actor. This thinking was made explicit in Henry Kissinger’s (1973) infamous ‘Year of Europe’ speech but it was implicit in US thinking up to 1990. To an extent it was an acceptance that the unique power enjoyed by America enabled it to exert influence in every corner of the world and that it played a decisive role as the leader of the Western world. Many European states, with the possible exceptions of Britain and France, ‘believe that their proper role to be that of stabilising the continent while the United States defends common interests elsewhere’ (Binnendijk and Kugler, 2002, 121). Wayne Thompson argued that the regional-global split is more complex than it first appears. The US is often drawn to regional solutions to problems whereas Europeans are attracted by global, multilateral solutions through international governmental organizations (Mahncke et al., 2004, 98).
Wyn Rees

Chapter 6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation

Abstract
The risk of the proliferation of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, goes to the heart of the debate concerning international order. The states that possess nuclear weapons have traditionally been those that have defined the contours of the order, whilst at the same time opposing countries that have sought to change or overturn that order. The acquisition of nuclear weapons offers an aspirant state a means of disproportionate influence because it provides them with the most powerful instruments of destruction known to man. Since the end of the Cold War nuclear armed states have found themselves trying to perpetuate a system based on double standards: namely, denying the development of nuclear weapons to aspirant states whilst at the same time refusing to divest themselves of their own weapons.
Wyn Rees

Chapter 7. Transatlantic Homeland Security Cooperation

Abstract
Transatlantic cooperation in countering international terrorism has been illustrative of the new agenda of security issues. Although not strictly a new phenomenon, after the experience of 9/11 it became the dominant paradigm in Western security thinking. By its nature, terrorism presents a complex set of security challenges. It has global reach, rendering all states potential targets, and attacks can occur anywhere without warning. Terrorism is perpetrated by non-state actors, yet it may receive covert support from a state sponsor (see Chapter 5). It is a form of violence that is difficult to counter with the traditional instruments of state power, because terrorists melt into the civilian population and leave no target against which to retaliate.
Wyn Rees

Conclusion

Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been two military security agendas in transatlantic relations. One security agenda has focused on Europe and has involved the adaptation of the roles of security organizations since 1990. The other security agenda has concerned the extent to which the EU and the US have cooperated in the face of growing global challenges such as states of concern, nuclear proliferation and international terrorism. It would be too simplistic to argue that strategic divergence has resulted from Europe concentrating on regional concerns and the US on global issues. Nevertheless, there have been marked tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic in their approach to extra-European security. These have included differences in both threat perception and in the instruments that each side employs. It has illustrated how perceptions of interests have led European states to varying levels of commitment when the threat they perceive is not existential.
Wyn Rees
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