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THE signature of the armistice ensured that the map and, in part, the institutions of Germany would be recast by the peace conference but the extent and method of this reshaping remained obscure. Much would depend on the overall assessment that each of the Allied states made of the future intentions and political stability of the new German regime, which sought, as best it could, to distance itself from the ambitions and methods of the Kaiser and his government. Was this deathbed conversion genuine or expedient, and who would control the new, apparently democratic, Germany? Furthermore, what roles did the Allies see for Germany in the new international system? The shape of the new Germany would depend on the outcome of the debate between their widely differing viewpoints.
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For details, see Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, Temperley, vol. 2, Nelson, Land and Power, and Elcock, Portrait of a Decision. Erich Eyck offers an interesting and balanced German perspective in A History of the Weimar Republic: vol. 1, From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg’s Election (New York, 1962), pp. 80–128. Headlam-Morley’s memo, 15.4.19, illustrates the complexity of the issues: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 76. Klaus Schwabe’s chapter ‘Germany’s Peace Aims and the Domestic and International Constraints’, in Boemeke et al., The Treaty of Versailles, pp. 37–67, illustrates the dilemma facing the new German government in November 1918 – did it seek to distance itself totally from the old regime and rely on the Allies recognising it as a new entity with no responsibility for the outbreak or conduct of the war which they would thus treat with generosity and forgiveness, or should it cling to the promise given to the previous government by the Allies in the Lansing Note of a treaty based upon Wilsonian principles? After much debate, it decided to opt for whatever security continuity might bring.
Stevenson, French War Aims, pp. 11–12, 23ff, 17, and 79; J. J. Becker, 1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la Guerre (Paris, 1977), p. 580.
Stephen Schuker, ‘The Rhineland Question’, in Boemeke et al., The Treaty of Versailles, pp. 276–77; Stevenson, French War Aims, pp. 78–79, 101.
Ibid., pp. 22, 118–19, 140; Watson, Clemenceau, pp. 332, 336–37; Lowry, Armistice, 1918, pp. 17–18; FRUS, vol. 5, pp. 376–86; Article 51, Treaty, p. 183; Prott, Politics of Self-Determination, pp. 54–82 and 148–79.
See Carolyn Grohmann’s important and revealing article, ‘From Lothringen to Lorraine: Expulsion and Voluntary Repatriation’, D&S 16, no. 3 (2005), pp. 571–87. On continuing Franco-German relations over Alsace-Lorraine, see Bariéty, Relations Franco-Allemandes, pp. 5–22; Walter A. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, 1978), p. 104, Elizabeth Vlossak Marianne or Germania? Nationalizing Women in Alsace, 1870–1946 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 169–252.
McDougall France’ s Rhineland Diplomacy, pp. 15–25; Stevenson, French War Aims; J. C. King, Foch versus Clemenceau: France and German Dismemberment, 1918–1919 (Harvard, 1960), pp. 1–27.
See King, ibid., pp. 3–10, on wartime literature and propaganda; A. Aulard, La Paix future d’après la Révolution Française et Kant (Paris, 1916), quoted King, p. 8; McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, pp. 16–32; Stevenson, French War Aims.
A. Ribot (ed.), Journal d’Alexandre Ribot et correspondances inédites, 1914–1922 (Paris, 1936), p. 93; Cmd 2169, pp. 2–3, 4–5.
Lloyd George, The Truth, vol. 1, pp. 132–47; Watson, Clemenceau, p. 353; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 206–09; King, Foch versus Clemenceau, Preface; R. McCrum, ‘French Rhineland Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919’, HJ 21, no. 3 (1978), pp. 623–48.
Text of Foch’s note in Cmd 2169, pp. 20–26; Lloyd George’s remark, 7.3.19, LGP F/147/1/1; Curzon’s speech, E4 in CAB 32/2. See also McCrum, ‘French Rhineland Policy’, p. 625.
There are a number of statues representing the major French towns in the Place de la Concorde. From 1871 until 1918, that symbolising Strasbourg (and hence the lost provinces) was covered in black. There was a moving ceremony, 17.11.18, in the Place, to celebrate their return; E. Bonnefous, Histoire Politique de la Troisième République (7 vols, Paris, 1967 edn), vol. 2, p. 424; A. Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty (1921), p. 171; Mantoux, Proceedings, p. 28.
Seymour, Intimate Papers, vol. 4, p. 345.
Ibid., p. 344; Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 220; Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. 2, p. 271.
Cmd 2169, pp. 42–57.
See McCrum, ‘French Rhineland Policy’, pp. 627–28.
Lloyd George, The Truth, vol. 1, p. 260.
Cmd 2169, pp. 61–65.
Lloyd George, The Truth, vol. 1, p. 403.
Tardieu, Truth about the Treaty, pp. 197–201; Cmd 2169, pp. 71–74.
Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 233–40.
R. Poincaré, Au Service de la France (11 vols, Paris, 1928–74), vol. 11, p. 337.
Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. 1, pp. 318–19.
FRUS, vol. 5, pp. 112–14, 117–18; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 238–43.
See a number of relevant articles by Lentin, ‘The Treaty that Never was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919’, in Judith Loades (ed.), The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, pp. 115–28; ‘“Une aberration inexplicable”? Clemenceau and the Abortive Anglo-French Guarantee Treaty of 1919’, D&S 8, no. 2 (1997), pp. 31–49; ‘Lloyd George, Clemenceau and the elusive Anglo-French guarantee treaty, 1919: “A disastrous episode”? in Sharp and Stone (eds), Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century, pp. 104–19; FRUS, vol. 5, p. 357; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 243–45. William Keylor, ‘The Rise and Demise of the Franco-American Guarantee Pact, 1919–1921’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, vol. 15 (1978), pp. 367–77.
McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, pp. 67–69; McCrum, ‘French Rhineland Policy’, pp. 637–42; Watson, Clemenceau, pp. 351–52.
Stevenson, French War Aims, p. 177, cf. Watson, Clemenceau, p. 352.
McCrum, ‘French Rhineland Policy’, p. 624.
Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, p. 35.
Nelson, Land and Power, p. 229; Keylor, ‘The Rise and Demise’, pp. 367–77; Schuker, ‘Rhineland Question’, pp. 310–12; Sharp, ‘Anglo-French relations from Versailles to Locarno’, in Sharp and Stone, Anglo-French Relations.
Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 249–52.
Letters to Hurst and Kerr, 7.2.19, Headlam-Morley, Memoir, pp. 23–24.
Stevenson, French War Aims, p. 177; Tardieu, Truth about the Treaty, pp. 251–62.
Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. 1, pp. 74, 69–71.
Stevenson, French War Aims, pp. 177–78; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 256–58.
Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 67. He had suggested three possibilities to the Four, 31.3.19, FRUS, vol. 5, pp. 66–70. See also pp. 60–61.
Headlam-Morley, Memoir, pp. 74, 78. The crucial debates occurred 9–13 April; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 272–81.
Headlam-Morley, Memoir, pp. 100–03.
Temperley, vol. 2, p. 176; Part VIII, Annex V, Treaty, pp. 512–13.
Temperley, vol. 2, p. 180.
Bariéty, Relations Franco-Allemandes, p. 139.
Stevenson, French War Aims, p. 179.
See Sally Marks, Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Chapel Hill, 1981), pp. 137–54, 206–306, 339–402, and Paul Hymans: Belgium (2010), pp. 51–109.
Minute, 28.2.19, quoted by Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, p. 41.
Meetings of 16 April and 4 June, Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. 1, pp. 261–63 and FRUS, vol. 4, pp. 800–01.
Headlam-Morley, Memoir, pp. 164–65; Stevenson, French War Aims, p. 170; Marks, Innocent Abroad, pp. 144–53.
Ibid., p. 153; Temperley, vol. 2, pp. 190–91.
The area was technically under American occupation but Foch ensured the presence of French troops by making the city his headquarters. Marks, Innocent Abroad, pp. 206–20; Stevenson, French War Aims, pp. 82–83, 183–84.
Minute April 1919, quoted by Marks, Innocent Abroad, p. 231.
See Marks, ibid., p. 229, for possible explanations.
Ibid., pp. 230–54.
Ibid., pp. 274–97; Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 39–43.
Temperley, vol. 2, pp. 197–203.
Stevenson, French War Aims, pp. 170, 183; Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. 2, p. 424.
Treaty, pp. 262–69; Temperley, vol. 2, pp. 203–06.
Rousseau advised the Poles in the eighteenth century: ‘If you cannot prevent being devoured, you must make sure that you will not be digested’, quoted by Piotr Wandycz, ‘The Polish Question’, in Boemeke et al., The Treaty of Versailles, pp. 313–35. Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 180. For an authoritative account of Polish affairs at the conference, see K. Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918–1919 (Odense, 1979). See also Anita Prazmowska Ignacy Paderewski: Poland (2009).
Stevenson, French War Aims, p. 86, Tel. 11.3.17, Russian ambassador in Paris to St Petersburg, Cmd 2169, p. 8.
Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 180.
Lloyd George, The Truth, vol. 1, p. 13 and War Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 525–26.
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1514.
FRUS, vol. 6, pp. 153–54.
‘It sounds like a joke that although President Wilson had been talking privately and publicly for months for the restoration of a modified Poland he is reported to have believed when he arrived in Paris that Prague was the capital of that already informally organised state. It was more excusable that he thought Bagdad to be in Persia and Sarajevo in Serbia.’ W. H. Dawson, Germany under the Treaty (1933), p. 31.
FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 773–81.
Ibid., pp. 1007, 1014.
See Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 145–75; FRUS, vol. 4, pp. 413–14.
FRUS, vol. 4, pp. 415, 419, 449–50.
Mantoux, Proceedings, pp. 29, 79–82.
Ibid., pp. 154–57, 181; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 176–97; Lutz Oberdorfer, ‘The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1920’, D&S 15, no. 3 (2004), pp. 573–592; Roger Moorhouse, ‘“The Sore which Would Never Heal”: The Genesis of the Polish Corridor’, D&S 16, no. 3 (2005), pp. 603–13.
Lloyd George, The Truth, vol. 1, p. 480; FRUS, vol. 6, pp. 139–43, 149–54, 196–97, 303–04, 316–18; Nelson, Land and Power, pp. 346–58.
Piotr Wandycz suggests that there were only 585,000 Germans in the border areas ceded to Poland. German sources claimed over a million Germans, but they included all Germans living in Poland. Polish sources suggest between 740,000 and 780,000. P. Wandycz, ‘Poland between East and West’, in G. Martel (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A. J. P. Taylor Debate After Twenty-Five Years (1986), pp. 195, 207n. See F. Gregory Campbell, ‘The Struggle for Upper Silesia, 1919–1922’, JMH 42, no. 3 (1970), on the subsequent history of the Upper Silesian dispute.
FRUS, vol. 6, pp. 196–97.
Mantoux, Proceedings, p. 82.
Percy, Memories, p. 68; Walworth, Wilson and his Peacemakers, p. 263.
C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (1962), pp. 109, 115.
Lorna S. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany: British Policy towards Postwar German Disarmament, 1914–1919 (Boston, 1985), p. 214; David Stevenson, ‘Britain, France and the Origins of German Disarmament, 1916–1919’, JSS 29, no. 2 (2006), pp. 195–224, p. 201.
Treaty, Articles 159–210, pp. 301–59. The conference debates can be followed in FRUS, vol. 4, pp. 183–360. See also Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp. 161–75, Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, pp. 43–45, and Lloyd George, The Truth, vol. 1, pp. 581–603. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany covers the issue and the earlier debates about policy very thoroughly. The naval issues are well covered in S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars: vol. 1, The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929 (2 vols, 1968, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 71–101. See also Richard Shuster, German Disarmament after World War I: The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection 1920–1931 (2006) and Sharp, ‘Mission Accomplished? Britain and the Disarmament of Germany, 1918–1923’, in Keith Hamilton and Edward Johnson (eds), Arms and Disarmament in Diplomacy (2007), pp. 73–90. Peter Jackson, ‘France and the Problems of Security and International Disarmament after the First World War’, JSS 29, no. 3 (2006), pp. 247–80. There is some confusion as to the exact number of vessels scuttled, with different sources giving different figures. I have used Holgar Herwig’s count of 66 (10 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 5 cruisers and 46 smaller craft) totalling around 500,000 tons. Only 8 vessels were saved. Holgar Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corps: A Social and Political History (Oxford, 1973), pp. 268–69.
FRUS, vol. 6, p. 954; Andrew Webster, ‘Making Disarmament Work: The Implementation of the International Disarmament Provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, 1919–1925’, D&S 16, no. 3 (2005), pp. 551–69, and ‘From Versailles to Geneva: The Many Forms of Interwar Disarmament’, JSS 29 no. 2 (2006), pp. 225–46.
J. F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Connecticut, 1982), pp. 3–48. I have based this section mainly on Willis’s authoritative study. See also Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp. 311–14; Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, pp. 24–29, Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, 2002); Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919–1950 (Oxford, 2014), pp. 27–121.
Sir C. E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (2 vols, 1927), vol. 2, p. 149.
Willis, Prologue, pp. 49–68.
Ibid., pp. 68–77.
Ibid., pp. 78–79. For an alternative view, see I. Floto, Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Aarhus, 1973), pp. 205–08. The debates may be followed in Mantoux, Proceedings, pp. 80, 90–93, 144–54.
Willis, Prologue, pp. 80–81. I am grateful to Professor Tony Lentin for the clarification of some legal technicalities on this issue.
Willis, Prologue, pp. 82–85.
Ibid., pp. 176, 98–147.
FC 6N72 7.5.19.
T. C. W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (1986), p. 27; F. Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (1931), pp. 536–41, 574–77. ‘I am not waging war for the sake of waging war’, Foch told House on 31 October 1918. ‘If I obtain through the Armistice the conditions that we wish to impose upon Germany, I am satisfied. Once this object is obtained, nobody has the right to shed one more drop of blood,’ p. 541.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Henry Wilson highlighted this lack of control, telling Lloyd George: ‘The root of the evil is that the Paris writ does not run’, quoted by MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 7. See Taylor, Origins of Second World War, pp. 51–52, and the critique by Sally Marks in Martel, Origins, pp. 26–27.
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